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Abstract
We study the early adoption of Twitter in the 111th House of Representatives. Our main
objective is to determine whether successes of past adopters have the tendency to speed up
Twitter adoption, where past success is dened as the average followers per Tweet - a common
measure of "Twitter success" - among all prior adopters. The data suggests that accelerated
adoption can be associated with favorable past outcomes: increasing the average number of
followers per Tweet among past adopters by a standard deviation (of 8 followers per Tweet)
accelerates the adoption time by about 112 days. This acceleration e¤ect is weaker for those who
already have adopted Facebook and those who have access to information about a large number
of past adopters. We later nd a positive relationship between an adopters realized followers per
Tweet and the success of adopters preceding him/her. Thus, there may exist benets associated
with adopting Twitter based on past successes of others. In general, the patterns we nd are
consistent with predictions generated by a simple model of adoption delay with learning.
Keywords: Di¤usion of technology, network e¤ects, political marketing, social learning, social
media.
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1 Introduction
Social learning can occur under two general contexts. Agents within a community can learn from
one another through past actions or outcomes of their peers. While economic theory gives us a rich
set of predictions for both contexts, the general body of empirical literature has primarily focused
on identifying these peer e¤ects under the context of social learning through observed actions;
despite the fact that clean identication of these e¤ects associated with peer behavior is inherently
hard (if not impossible). For one thing, these so-called peer e¤ects may be spurious; and even
if they are not spurious, they are not necessarily caused by learning, as competing explanations
involving crowding and network externalities often play a (larger) role. Using information about
past outcomes would certainly alleviate some of these identication problems. We conjecture that
this void in the literature is likely due to the fact that obtaining data on both agent behavior and
their relevant outcomes is hard to come by. That said, this paper proposes using data from the
recent Twitter adoption craze among American Congressional members to address some of these
deciencies in current research.
Our data about Twitter adoption in the 111th House of Representatives is interesting for two
reasons: 1) we can observe the precise day in which a representative made his/her rst Twitter
post (i.e., the date of adoption); and 2) their realized and publicly observable success at attaining
followers per Twitter post (i.e., a typical metric for inuence on Twitter1). The order of each
politicians adoption allows us to measure the potential amount of information available to them
at the time of adoption; that is, for each adopter, we can approximate the success of his/her
predecessors he/she can potentially observe. Therefore, we can estimate the link between positive
information - in the form of large averages for the followers/Tweet among past adopters - and the
date of adoption for a politician in question that may exist. Given the novelty of Twitter in general,
we expect that these information signals generated by past adoption behavior to play some role in
the decisions of potential adopters. Even though the monetary cost of opening a Twitter account
is zero, politicians may still be hesitant to adopt Twitter right away if doing so yields lackluster
follower/Tweet statistics, thereby revealing their weak support. However, if they observe that other
politicians have been successful at maintaining a follower base, then adopting soon after may also
generate these benets.
We rst establish a relationship between the incentive to adopt early and favorable signals using
a simple model of delay. In the model, a risk averse agent has to decide whether to adopt a new
1Refer to Comm (2010) for more details.
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technology of uncertain value today, or wait until tomorrow. By waiting until the next period,
he enjoys the possibility of receiving an additional information signal (on top of the set already
available to him). Because he discounts the future, this updated posterior comes at a price. In
light of favorable signals, the incentive to adopt right away increases: any value that comes from an
additional signal next period will be outweighed by the opportunity cost of missing out on a high
expected payo¤ (based on less information). The model also predicts that the agent will not wish
to wait if his initial prior is already precise. Furthermore, the impact associated with favorable
signals is dampened if the agent has already observed a large number of signals. In other words,
these signals matter very little to those who are already knowledgeable. Our last observation from
this model is that the impact associated with favorable signals is concave.
Interpreting the followers/Tweet outcomes among past adopters as information signals, we es-
timate the impact that these signals have on the number of days it takes a politician to adopt
Twitter. Our baseline estimates reveal that a standard deviation increase in the average follow-
ers/Tweet among past adopters decreases the time of adoption by about 112 days. Furthermore,
those who have already adopted Facebook begin using Twitter soon, are less inuenced by increases
in the average followers/Tweet based on past information. As Facebook and Twitter are very simi-
lar, one may argue that those with Facebook have a more precise prior about the merits of Twitter;
thus, these patterns are consistent with what our simple model would predict. Similarly, we nd
that the acceleration e¤ect associated with favorable information is also dampened by the number
of past adopters. Those who already have, potentially, access to a large set of signals may not enjoy
much option value in waiting for new signals.
Further analysis of our data reveals an interesting lag structure between a Twitter users own
success, and the success of those before him: increasing the average followers/Tweet among past
adopters is associated with an increase in a current adopters own followers/Tweet by a propor-
tionate amount. In other words, a politician who adopts soon after successful Twitter adopters
may enjoy success himself. This result suggests that these information signals can actually benet
Twitter users.
Our extensions show that recent information about past adoption outcomes has a greater impact
on older information about past adoption outcomes; however, more information in general has
a greater impact on behavior and own realized outcome. We also consider the possibility that
politicians react not to the raw information available to them about past outcomes, but instead,
compare these observed outcomes to some expectation. As such, we evaluate the impact that
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positive and negative surprises have on the speed of adoption. Not surprisingly, an increase in
the proportion of positive surprises associated with past outcomes accelerates adoption, while an
increase in the average number of negative surprises decelerates adoption. Finally, we are able to
nd that while politicians do not appear to react much di¤erent to information sources coming
from within and outside their home state, only those whose adoption occurs after a sequence of
successful outcomes within the same state actually benet. One may then stipulate the existence
of some informational advantage associated with geography.
Why should politicians even care about how many users follow them on Twitter? Users who
follow a politician will continually be updated with that politicians newest micro-blog entry. Those
who choose to follow a politician are most likely people who actually want to read and pay attention
to his content. Therefore, a person who chooses to add a politician to his follower list essentially
designates this politician as an opinion leader (Boynton, 2010). Being an opinion leader may help a
politician push controversial policies or satisfy his need for narcissistic self promotion (McFedries,
2007). In general, Twitter itself also cares about how many followers its users have. An important
and e¢ cient way to catalyze user generated content within a social network is to increase the
number of captive followers/friends/readers each user has. Recent studies have shown that content
generation largely depends on the size of a users group of friends (Hofstetter, Shriver, and Nair,
2010; Zhang and Zhu, 2010). Twitters role is to stimulate group formation, and what it gets
in return is free content from its users. Not surprisingly, many social media outlets now push
friendship/follower recommendations.
There are a number of confounding factors that can potentially discount our results. The rst
issue has to do with unobserved heterogeneity, or permanent correlated e¤ects among adopters
around similar time periods using Manskis (1993) terminology. While our data lacks the necessary
panel structure for xed e¤ects estimation, we argue that under some assumptions, controlling
for the order of entry may control for omitted variables such as unobserved adoption costs. The
second issue has to do with sample selection, in that the adoption times we observe are only for
those who adopted. We also acknowledge that some of the adoption decisions may have been made
deterministically around the time of the start of o¢ ce (January 20, 2009), or that information signals
received by the earliest adopters are based on too few observations. Given that each politician makes
his/her adoption decision in sequence, a relevant concern is temporal correlation of error terms
across adopters around similar time intervals. This issue can be framed under Manskis setting as a
transitory correlated e¤ect, in that early adopters are likely to face similar time-sensitive shocks as
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their peers. Finally, contextual e¤ects may also mislead us about the impact of past information.
For instance, powerful politicians are likely to have a strong following on Twitter. Those who
adopted soon after may not be doing so to exploit information externalities, but instead, making a
desperate attempt to reach out to their peers with clout.
Our estimates appear to be robust to many of these problems, though, the magnitude of the
acceleration e¤ect associated with favorable past information drops considerably (but remains pos-
itive at a statistically signicant level) when we control for autocorrelated errors. This caveat is
likely the result from the fact that these decisions are often made days from one another. We view
this limitation as a unique trade-o¤ that our data presents: on the one hand, the sequential nature
of observed behavior and outcomes allow us to circumvent a number of simultaneity problems asso-
ciated with typical peer e¤ects model, but on the other hand, this very sequential nature introduces
temporal persistence of shocks that we are unable to control for (i.e., increasing media awareness
about the e¤ectiveness of Twitter as a self-promotion tool).
An alternative explanation for the patterns we observe is based on the idea of network exter-
nalities. If the average followers/Tweet proxies for potential interactions between politicians on
Twitter, then the observed acceleration e¤ect can be explained by some politicians wishing to wait
until the online social network reaches some critical mass. Once they see that a large number of
peers have already adopted, then Twitter is viewed as a valuable outlet to communicate with one
another; note that under this alternative, politicians are not actually learning from one another.
Unfortunately, we are unable to completely rule out the competing network e¤ects story, as bet-
ter data is needed. However, recent textual analysis by Golbeck, Grimes and Rogers (2010) hints
that Twitter is primarily used as a 1-way broadcasting device as a means to spread information
about them (for self promotion) and their forthcoming policies. One of their ndings reveal that
among the rare instances that 2-way communication actually takes place, these Tweets are 7 times
more likely to be between non-politicians than fellow politicians. Therefore, our prior is that these
network e¤ects are unlikely to completely wash away the conjectured learning e¤ects we nd.
Aside from providing us a useful setting to study sequential learning, the use of Twitter in
politics is itself an interesting and important topic. The desire to get all American politicians
onto Twitter has led to organizations like TweetCongress.org, whose mandate is to encourage all
politicians to adopt Twitter as a means to increase government transparency2. Although it is not
obvious whether politicians are using Twitter for outreach or transparency (Chi and Yang, 2010;
2Similar organizations emerged in other countries, such as polTwitter.ca in Canada, and Tweetminster.co.uk in
England.
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Felten, 2009; Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers, 2010), the role of Twitter represents a shift away
from traditional government operations towards so-called E-Government. Perhaps the strongest
motivation for E-Government is a recent study by Andersen (2009), which nds that the corruption
index is typically lower for countries who employ E-Government practices. Not surprisingly, Twitter
has marketed itself as being a useful tool for politicians to stay connected with their constituents
and inform the public about their platforms/policies3.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline recent and relevant literature that
has guided this paper. Section 3 describes the unique data we hand-collected. We then proceed to
describe a simple model of adoption delay in order to generate some predictions that can be tested
with the data on hand. Our main empirical methodology is described in Section 5; included in that
discussion is also a list of identication problems that we attempt to address. The main results are
presented in Section 6. We then conclude with Section 7.
2 Related literature
Our work is most related to recent empirical work that aims to identify social learning. As men-
tioned earlier, there are two main approaches to identication of social learning4. The rst is to infer
learning based on the impact that peer behavior/perception has ones own behavior/perception.
Some examples include the analysis of how average perceptions of HIV/AIDS risk within a social
network a¤ects ones own perception (Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins, 2007), the increased likeli-
hood of purchasing a computer if a large proportion of neighbors have already done so (Goolsbee
and Klenow, 2002), and how the adoption of new crops is a¤ected by the adoption choices of farmers
within a social network of friends and family (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006).
The second main approach, which is the one we incorporate, is to investigate whether past
observable outcomes (a¤ecting peers) has an impact on ones own behavior. Notable examples
include the analysis of how box o¢ ce surprises in opening weekend demand a¤ect subsequent
sales of movies (Moretti, 2010), whether the performance of schools that use new educational
products/programs has an impact on the propensity that subsequent schools also adopt these
products/programs (Forbes, 2009), and the impact of past farming outcomes within a social network
a¤ects a farmers input decision (Conley and Udry, 2010). Our work complements the existing
literature by o¤ering a new perspective about sequential learning: instead of looking at how past
3Refer to Mashables article "Twitter Goes to Washington, Hires Former Congressional Sta¤er" by Jolie ODell
on November 4, 2010 (http://mashable.com/2010/11/04/twitter-washington/).
4Another approach is to incorporate structural econometric estimation, such as Buera, Monge-Naranjo, and Prim-
iceri (2010) in their study of Bayesian learning among policy makers across countries.
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outcomes a¤ect the propensity to adopt, we investigate how past outcomes a¤ect delay of adoption.
By focusing on delay, we allow for the possibility of strategic learning. An agent may have an
incentive to delay entry into Twitter so as to take full advantage these informational externalities
bring.
Strategic learning is a heavily studied topic in economic theory. Perhaps the most relevant
models are those proposed by Caplin and Leahy (1998), and Chamley and Gale (1994). Although
the methods they use to study social learning are di¤erent, they both come to similar conclusions:
the existence of information externalities may delay entry into uncertain environments. This in-
centive to "wait-and-see" has been used to explain a number of economic phenomena, such as slow
recoveries after economic recessions, and investment lags into local/global markets.
In general, the empirical analysis of social learning is nested within the study of peer/network
e¤ects. Identifying peer e¤ects is particularly challenging. As Manski (1993) points out, even if en-
dogeneity and simultaneity of actions are addressed, the identication of peer e¤ects are confounded
by contextual and correlated group e¤ects. Contextual e¤ects refer to the fact that characteris-
tics of a group may be driving the behavior of an agent in question, not the behavior of peers.
Correlated e¤ects refer to the fact that those in the same group may act in a similar manner for
some unforeseen reason. In spite of these challenges, a number of interesting applications5 have
emerged, such as the study of peer e¤ects under the context of school performance (Sacerdote,
2001), academic research (Waldinger, 2007), voting behavior among politicians (Cohen and Mal-
loy, 2010), role of connections in institutional investing (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2009), and
worker productivity (Mas and Moretti, 2009). A common way to address contextual e¤ects is to
include characteristics associated with the peers6, as done in Markman et. al. (2003). To address
correlated e¤ects, one obvious approach would be to add group xed e¤ects, as done in Fletcher
(2010). Contextual e¤ects under the context of Twitter adoption may be related to the idea that
politicians are adopting quickly not because of the information from past adoption outcomes, but
because past adopters are high prole and well connected politicians whom potential adopters wish
to connect with via Twitter. Correlated e¤ects may come in two forms, xed or permanent. For
instance, early adopters may adopt early simply because they are comfortable with technology and
therefore face the lowest intangible adoption costs; on the other hand, early adopters may adopt
early because they all faced similar transitory shocks, such as a recently published news report in
5Refer to Scheinkman (2008) for a survey of theory behind many of these social interaction models that motivate
empirical applications.
6Refer to Graham and Hahn (2005) for identication of a linear-in-means peer e¤ects model with group (and
individual specic) xed e¤ects.
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the NY Times about the explosive growth of Twitter membership.
Twitter adoption in politics has also received growing attention in political science. Two recent
studies by Williams and Gulati (2010) and Lassen and Brown (2010) try to characterize who
adopts Twitter. Aside from nding a strong correlation between being a Republican and Twitter
use, these two studies are unable to explain why some politicians adopt Twitter, while others do
not. Their studies belong to the stream of research about government communications and political
marketing. Research in economics about political marketing is rather scarce. One example though is
research by Gordon and Hartmann (2010), who build a structural econometric model of advertising
competition.
Finally, one may frame the Twitter adoption decision as Karshenas and Stonemans (1993)
interpretation of technology di¤usion7. The authors argue that rank, stock and order e¤ects matter
in the timing of technology adoption. Rank e¤ects are described as the inherent characteristics
that di¤er across potential adopters, stock e¤ects pertain to the idea that the benet of technology
adoption may fall as the number of past adopters increases, and order e¤ects may suggest that
early adopters have some form of rst mover advantage.
3 Data
The setting for our analysis is the recent adoption of Twitter among members in the 111th House
of Representatives. Our sample contains information about 438 politicians, 183 of whom adopted
Twitter. Furthermore, the data can be broken down into four main components. Each variable
is listed and described in Table 1. The rst and most important subset of variables contains
hand-collected information about each adopters Twitter behavior, such as the exact date in which
his/her rst Twitter post was made8, as well as the number of followers, users followed, and posts
made at the time of our data collection (May 24, 2010).
[INSERT TABLE 1]
With the exception of Eric Cantor, all House Representatives adopted Twitter after President
Barack Obamas rst Twitter post on April 29, 2007. That said, we construct our key dependent
variable, the number of days to adopt, to be equal to the number of days it took for an adopter to
7The literature about technology di¤usion is very large. That said, refer to Federica (2002) for a general overview
of these studies. On a similar note, Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2005) study the adoption of Internet across
America.
8Note that Twitter adoption and use may not actually be done explicitly by the politician himself. It is often the
case that this task is delegated to a junior level sta¤er. Nevertheless, the politician often has to grant this right to a
sta¤er. Throughout the paper we refer to the adoption decision as being a decision made by the politician, although
it should be perfectly clear that interns/sta¤ers are often involved.
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make his/her rst Tweet, since Barack Obamas rst Twitter post. As Figure 1 shows, there were
not many adopters initially, followed by a gradual growth in adoption. The average adopter took
about 695 days (after the President) to adopt Twitter. Clearly, the adoption of Twitter did not
occur overnight.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
From each politicians Twitter account, we are able to obtain information about how many
Twitter posts he/she made since becoming a member, as well as his/her following. The status
of many inuential Twitter users is often measured using a popular measure of inuence (Comm,
2010): the number of followers divided by the total number of Twitter posts. Presumably, those
with a lot of inherent inuence need not post many updates on Twitter in order to maintain a
strong following. Based on this crude measure of inuence, the most successful users of Twitter
are Dennis Kucinich (109.6667), Eric Cantor (104.8368), Ron Paul (97.85263), Gwen Moore (92),
and Alan Grayson (75.62376). Their numbers are quite signicant, given that the typical politician
obtains a ratio of about 13 followers per Tweet. There is a lot of variation in this ratio; much of
this variation cannot be explained by when a politician adopted as Figure 2 illustrates. Adopting
early does not yield an obvious rst mover advantage with respect to this measure of clout.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
The second major component of our data consists of aggregated information about his/her con-
stituents, such as the districts average population, income and racial distribution. This information
was obtained from the most recent U.S. Census. These variables may play a part in the decision to
adopt, as Table 3 illustrates. Running the data through a simple probit reveals that population may
be a key demographic driver in the adoption of Twitter. That is, politicians who govern heavily
populated districts are more likely to adopt than those who govern smaller populations. Income
and race appear to play less of a role in the adoption of Twitter.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
We also have information about each politicians personal and professional characteristics. For
personal characteristics, we can identify the age, gender, race, degree type and whether he/she
is Catholic. For political characteristics, we can identify whether the politician is an incumbent,
his/her tenure, party allegiance, the number of bills sponsored, the number of committees assigned
to, and whether he/she chairs any committee. These variables may play a role in Twitter adoption.
In particular, Table 3 shows that the number of bills has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the
adoption of Twitter, while being a Democrat greatly reduces the likelihood of adoption. The fact
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that Republicans are more active in Twitter has generated a lot of media and scholarly attention.
Therefore, party allegiance would certainly be an important control to include in any analysis about
the speed of adoption among adopters.
Finally, we also include dummies for whether each politician adopts MySpace, RSS, Flickr,
Facebook and/or Youtube; all of which are some alternative (and older) outlets for social media.
Facebook is perhaps the closest to Twitter, in terms of its functionality and the way it is used
by politicians. Representatives who hold both Facebook and Twitter accounts often post identical
updates on both their Facebook and Twitter pages. Furthermore, Twitter and Facebook have
recently made their interfaces compatible with one another; that is, you can update your Twitter
account via Facebook, and vice versa. This has created some level of synergy between the two
social media outlets. On top of that, we believe that Facebook is the closest proxy one can have
for indicating a politicians past knowledge/expertise with social media. Consequently, one can
certainly see the complementarity between these two technologies in Table 3; a large proportion of
Twitter adopters are also Facebook users. Between the two social media outlets, Facebook is the
rst mover, having had at least 2 years of a head start over Twitter. Not surprisingly, many of the
politicians adopted Facebook well before they had the opportunity to adopt Twitter (Williams and
Gulati, 2009).
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Looking at Table 2, we see that the average Twitter adopter is almost 60 years old, and has
about 9 years in o¢ ce. These numbers suggest that Twitter is not exclusively used by young
politicians catering to their younger constituents. On average, a typical adopter is also quite active
on K-Street, having sponsored about 18 bills, and being part of almost 2 committees (out of a
possible 4).
4 Simple model of adoption delay
Consider a two period model in which a potential adopters decision is whether to employ a new
technology today, or tomorrow (with a discount rate of  < 1). Suppose that this potential adopter
has received n signals about the technologys quality. This technology comes at no real monetary
cost, and has value   N(0; 1=). Each signal is dened as sn =  + "n, with "n  N(0; 1=").
Denote the history of observed signals as sn = fs1; :::; sng. Provided that the potential adopter is
Bayesian, the updated mean and variance of  are given by
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E(jsn) = s1 + :::+ sn
n
V (jsn) = 1
 + n"
Suppose that the agent has a very simple mean-variance utility,
E(U j) = E(j)  V (j)
where  measures the agents degree of risk aversion. For simplicity, set  = 1. If the agent adopts
today, he receives an expected utility of E(U jsn) = E(jsn)   V (jsn). Waiting until tomorrow
can yield two possible outcomes: 1) The number of signals is still n with probability ; or 2) the
number of signals has increased to n + 1 with probability 1   . Therefore, the utility associated
with adopting tomorrow (with the information available today) is
E[E(U jsn+1)jsn] = fE(U jsn) + (1  )[E(jsn)  V (jsn+1)]g
= fE(jsn) + [(1  )=( + (n+ 1)")]g
Note that the equation above uses the result that E[E(jsn+1)jsn] = E(jsn):
E[E(jsn+1)jsn] = E(s1 + :::+ sn + sn+1
n+ 1
jsn)
= E(
nE(jsn) +  + "n+1
n+ 1
jsn)
=
nE(jsn) + E(jsn)
n+ 1
= E(jsn)
Therefore, the net benet of adopting today over tomorrow is
NB(E(jsn); ) = (1  ) 
(1  )( + n") + (1  )"
E(jsn)( + n")( + n" + ")
The rst observation that comes to mind is that the constant term (1 )(+n")+(1 )"
is strictly greater than zero. This means that for certain values of E(jsn), the net benet of
adopting right away may be negative. However, for large enough values of E(jsn), the agent
would certainly prefer to adopt today rather than tomorrow. Therefore, the incentive to adopt
today increases (non-trivially) with E(jsn).
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The net benet of adopting today has limiting values of
lim
!0
NB(E(jsn); ) =
n(1  )[(n+ 1)"   1]  (1  )
n(n+ 1)"
lim
!1
NB(E(jsn); ) = (1  )
From these limiting values, we see that
lim
!1
NB(E(jsn); )  lim
!0
NB(E(jsn); ) = n(1  ) + (1  ) > 0
Therefore, the net benet of adopting today is larger when the agents prior is very precise (i.e.
 ! 1) as compared to when the agents prior is very di¤use (i.e.  ! 0). Intuitively, this
result should be obvious: an agent who is given a choice between a certain payo¤ today, versus the
same payo¤ tomorrow should certainly choose to receive the payo¤ today. Further investigation of
the marginal e¤ect of E(jsn) on the net benet of adopting today reveals additional predictions.
Given that the marginal e¤ect of E(jsn) is
@NB(E(jsn); )
@E(jsn) =
1
E(jsn)2 
(1  )( + n") + (1  )"
( + n")( + n" + ")
> 0;
we can obtain its limiting values:
lim
!1
@NB(E(jsn); )
@E(jsn) = 0
lim
!0
@NB(E(jsn); )
@E(jsn) =
1
E(jsn)2 
n(1  ) + (1  )
n(n+ 1)"
> 0
The marginal e¤ect of E(jsn) is smaller when the agents prior is very precise as compared
to when his prior is very di¤use. One can show in a similar manner that the marginal e¤ect of
E(jsn) falls as the number of past signals tends to innity. In general, favorable signals should
only matter for those with little prior information.
One can also show that the net benet is concave with respect to E(jsn) as @
2NB(E(jsn);)
@E(jsn)2 < 0.
To summarize, this simple model generates the following testable predictions:
1. A large and favorable signal E(jsn) induces an agent to adopt the new technology sooner.
2. An agent with a precise prior  will adopt the new technology sooner.
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3. The acceleration e¤ect that E(jsn) has on technology adoption is small for an agent with a
precise prior .
4. The acceleration e¤ect that E(jsn) has on technology adoption is small for an agent who
has already received a large number of signals.
5. The acceleration e¤ect is concave in E(jsn).
5 Empirical strategy
We rst outline the set of regressions aimed to test the three predictions as motivated by our
simple model. This is followed by proposed estimations to evaluate whether adopting after favorable
information signals actually pays o¤. The nal part discusses potential identication problems that
we may face with the data.
5.1 Do favorable signals speed up Twitter adoption?
Each politician is indexed by i = 1; :::; N , in the order in which they adopted Twitter, 1 being
the rst adopter, and N being the last adopter. In our sample, N = 183. For each adopter i, we
observe the exact date in which they adopted. Using each exact date, we construct the "days to
adopt" variable, ti, by calculating the distance between the actual date of adoption, and Barack
Obamas adoption date of April 29, 2007. By construction, t1 < t2 < ::: < tN . Each politician i has
access to the information signals regarding the success of past Twitter adopters,  i. We measure
the information signal i receives using the average number of followers/Tweet for all j < i, denoted
by f i.
Note that this measure does not perfectly capture the actual set of signals that adopter i may
receive, as f i is calculated using data we collected well after their adoption decisions. Consequently,
we have to make an assumption that states: f i is invariant over time. That is, the followers/Tweet
we observed at the time of data collection is a good proxy for the followers/Tweets potential
adopters actually observed. This assumption is potentially very unattractive, as Twitter clout can
easily change over time; say, if a politician improves the content of his Twitter posts over time.
One necessary condition for our assumption is that f i is the same, regardless of when the data
is collected. We test our assumption using data provided by Boynton (2010) that he used in a
recent study. What his data has that ours does not is an additional day in which Twitter activity
is recorded. In his sample, he observes Twitter activity (i.e., followers, following, and number of
Tweets) for two time periods, January and June 2009. Therefore, we can check and see whether our
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calculated f i is likely to vary over time. A simple correlation analysis reveals that each politicians
number of followers/Tweet is almost perfectly correlated9 between the two dates. One may then
stipulate that the followers/Tweet we use based on data collected on May 24, 2010 should be a
close proxy to the followers/Tweet that a potential adopter may have seen.
For each adopter i, we include controls xi that may capture rank e¤ects associated with technol-
ogy adoption (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993). Our prior is that we do not expect estimates of  to
be signicant, given that recent studies in political science (Lassen and Brown, 2010; Williams and
Gulati, 2010) have been rather inconclusive regarding the impact of similar explanatory variables.
That said, our main regression can be written as
ti = +   f i + x0i + "i
where "i satises the usual OLS assumptions. With this regression, we can test the rst prediction
from our model: a large favorable signal speeds up Twitter adoption. For our data to support the
prediction, we need H0 :  < 0. That is, the earliest adopters should have followed a sequence of
successful adopters with a large number of followers/Tweet.
It may also be interesting to study whether politicians discriminate across these signals. The
easiest way to group the sequence of observed signals is to classify them as coming from the adopters
belonging to the same or di¤erent political party as the potential adopter. Using this grouping,
we construct the variables f i;own and f i;other to measure the average number of followers/Tweet
among past adopters belonging to the same and other party as i respectively. Our model does not
guide us to an obvious direction. What these variables may (or may not) tell us is whether the
origin of information matters. For example, politicians from the same political party may have
a greater awareness of one another, and therefore, greater awareness of their adoption outcomes.
Furthermore, this specication may give us an idea about the sensitivity of our results with respect
to how we group peers10.
To test the latter two predictions from our model, we need a variable that captures a politicians
prior about social media. Given the positive correlation between Facebook and Twitter adoption
(Table 3), along with similar user interfaces, we argue that Facebook may be an appropriate
indicator of whether a politician is familiar with the merits of social media or not. Furthermore, as
Facebook adoption took place well before Twitter adoption (Williams and Gulati, 2009), concerns
about simultaneity between the two decisions may not be that relevant. The reader is asked to
9Correlation coe¢ cient of over 0.95.
10Refer to Manski (1993).
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interpret Facebook adoption as such: those with Facebook accounts, and therefore, familiar with
social media should have a more precise prior about the merits of Twitter than those without
Facebook accounts. Therefore, setting the Facebook dummy equal to 1 is our way of approximating
the case in which  !1. That said, our regression to test the second and third predictions is:
ti = + 1  f i + 2  Facebooki + 3  f i  Facebooki + x0i + "i
For our data to support the second and third predictions, we need H0 : 2 < 0, and H0 : 3 > 0.
Firstly, Twitter adoption should occur faster for those with Facebook accounts. Secondly, the
acceleration e¤ect that favorable past outcomes have on adoption speed should be dampened if the
politician already holds a Facebook account. To test our next hypothesis, we run the following
estimation:
ti = + 1  f i + 2  (i  1) + 3  f i  (i  1) + x0i + "i
where (i   1) is the number of past adopters prior to i (i.e., the order of is entry into Twitter).
For the fourth hypothesis to hold, we need H0 : 3 > 0. All in all, these regressions should tell us
whether adopters are making use of the information available, and whether those who appear to
react strongly to this information are those who are likely to nd this information valuable.
Finally, to test for concavity, we consider
ti = + 1  f i + 2  f2 i + x0i + "i
If the relationship between adoption speed and the average of past outcomes is concave, then
we would need that H0 : 2 > 0: the marginal impact associated with f i is largest when evaluated
at small values of f i.
5.2 Are favorable signals from the past associated with successful Twitter adop-
tion today?
The estimations above tell us nothing about whether politicians are using their available information
to increase their payo¤. In this section, we outline the strategy used to assess whether politicians
are making use of their information. Although we have no way of measuring the channels between
information and adoption, then adoption to success, we can analyze the direct channel between
past information and own success. Our model stipulates that those who receive positive signals
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are more likely to enter earlier. This behavior should intuitively generate a positive correlation
between positive signals and own success should they be acting optimally.
Denoting own success at attaining followers/Tweet as fi, we carry out the following estimation
fi = +   f i + x0i + "i
If favorable past signals are any indication of own success, we should see H0 :  > 0. We repeat
the same exercise as the previous section by running similar regressions that involve f i;own and
f i;other, as well as regressions that include interaction terms between Facebook adoption and f i.
5.3 Identication
Although our data puts us in a unique position to analyze the impact of past available information
on adoption speed, there are a number of issues that may prohibit us from clean identication.
We now outline the numerous problems that may weaken our results, as well as ways in which we
address them.
5.3.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
The data we use contains a lot of information about each politician. Nevertheless, a rich set of co-
variates is an insu¢ cient solution to unobserved heterogeneity. It could very well be that those who
face low and unobserved adoption costs are also those who also likely to generate observed favorable
signals. Low adoption costs may also be correlated with their technologically savvy. Furthermore,
those with low adoption costs are also likely to enter the Twittersphere rst. Therefore, those with
low (but not the lowest) adoption costs who immediately follow these technologically politicians
need not be doing so because of the favorable information they receive, but because they themselves
also have low adoption costs. Without panel data, it is di¢ cult to address these concerns.
Our prescription is to make two assumptions about the individual xed e¤ect, !i. The rst
assumption is that it monotonically increases with i. That is, it can be interpreted as: politicians
who adopt later may also be those who have high adoption costs, characterized by the xed e¤ect.
The second assumption is that each individuals xed e¤ect is equally spaced; i.e., !i   !i 1 = .
These two assumptions allow us to write the xed e¤ect recursively as !i = (i 1)+ !1. Including
this term into the original estimation equation yields
ti = (+ !1) +   f i + x0i + (i  1)+ "i
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While this approach does not free us completely of issues related to unobserved heterogeneity,
it provides us some way to add skepticism/conservatism to the estimates for . In some respects,
the inclusion of each adopters order of entry captures both the order and stock e¤ects as described
by Karshenas and Stoneman (1993).
5.3.2 Correlated errors
Adoption time is at a granular level, and the time of adoption between two adopters can potentially
be just days, so we should expect that the error terms of consecutive adopters may be correlated.
For instance, those who adopted on di¤erent days, but within the same week may have received
similar information shocks about the use of Twitter in politics, say, through the NY Times or
Wall Street Journal. The impact of past shocks may confound our identication of the so-called
acceleration e¤ect. Positive shocks that a¤ected past adopters may have coincidentally boosted their
followers/Tweet, may also induce subsequent adopters to enter soon after; therefore, early entry
need not be explained by the presence of favorable information through past adoptersoutcomes,
but instead by the presence of favorable information through some other mechanism, say news
media, that simply carries over through time.
To address this relevant concern, we allow the error terms to be serially correlated with an
AR(1) process. Therefore, we estimate
ti = +   f i + x0i + "i
"i = "i 1 + i
where i is assumed to be white noise. Recall that each adopter is ordered, so we are essentially
specifying an empirical model that allows a current adopters error to depend on the error associated
with those before him/her.
5.3.3 Selection bias
Our sample of Twitter adopters is a selected sample among the entire population of congres-
sional members. Using a similar argument as our discussion about unobserved heterogeneity, early
adopters may not necessarily be reacting to positive information shocks, but instead, to their own
ability to use social media.
We can interpret the adoption and timing decisions as a two-step process. In the rst step, a
representative decides whether to open up a Twitter account. Once they have decided to become
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a member, they must decide when. The rst stage decision can be modelled using the Probit
estimates obtained in Table 3. This rst stage will provide us the Heckman correction term as
described by the Mills ratio ^ii from the rst-stage adoption Probit estimates. To correct for this
sample selection bias, we estimate the following second-stage regression with a Heckman correction
term
ti = +   f i + x0i +  
^i
i
+ "i
An analogous strategy is employed for the analysis of own followers/Tweet.
5.3.4 Temporal factors
There is a clustering of Twitter adoption around the beginning of session, January 20, 2009. There-
fore, we have cause for concern that some of these late adopters may not be adopting late because
of bad signals, but simply because it was when congressional sta¤ers were hired and assigned to
manage membersTwitter accounts. We consider a sub-sample of politicians for which their adop-
tion decisions are unlikely to be a¤ected by this temporal shock: the sub-sample of politicians who
entered Twitter, but not around the start of session within a 200 day window (i.e., 100 days before
January 20, 2009, and 100 days after that date).
One may also argue that the measure f i is very inaccurate for the initial adopters, as the
averages may be computed with very few observations. This measure may therefore lack credibility
for the earliest Twitter users. Consequently, we consider using estimations using only the sub-
sample of adopters who follow at least 50 past users. Using this approach, we ensure that each
politicians signal is calculated using at least 50 observations.
5.3.5 Contextual e¤ects
As we are looking at the average outcomes of past adopters, our analysis can be framed under
Manskis (1993) linear peer e¤ects model. To some extent, the sequential and granular nature of
our data frees us of some issues related to simultaneity of adoption decisions. What remains to
be shown is that our results are robust to the correlated and contextual e¤ects. Correlated e¤ects
describe the fact that early adoption may not be caused by favorable information shocks from their
peers, but instead, the fact that early adopters share similar unobserved benets/costs associated
with Twitter adoption.
These unobserved components can either have a permanent component, or transitory compo-
nent. For example, the 10th adopter may have opened up a Twitter account early because he
behaves in the same way as other tech savvy politicians. To some extent, permanent unobserved
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group e¤ects can be addressed using our earlier prescription for unobserved heterogeneity: con-
trolling the order of entry may also control for these permanent correlated e¤ects across adopters
among similar cohorts. Transitory group e¤ects may include the fact that early adopters face similar
idiosyncratic shocks as other early adopters. This identication problem can be framed using our
solution to correlated errors. Finding a large estimate for  would suggest that these unobservable
group e¤ects persist over time.
If contextual e¤ects matter, these e¤ects may even proxy for network externalities. Past adopters
who happen to also come from Ivy league schools may have stronger alumni ties. These ties would
be correlated with their own popularity on social media sites, like Twitter. Potential adopters may
be induced to enter early not because of this observed Twitter clout, but because they wish to reach
out to these well-connected Ivy league politicians via Twitter. To some extent, the characteristics
of past adopters may partially (but not completely) control for motives associated with network
e¤ects.
In order to control for these contextual e¤ects, we include average characteristics of all past
adopters, x i into the following regression
ti = +   f i + x0i + x0 i + "i
6 Main results
Many of our results support the predictions generated by the model. In the rst column of Table 4,
we see that increasing the followers/Tweet signal by 8 yields a statistically signicant decrease in
adoption time by nearly 112 days. Given that the average adopter takes about 695 days to adopt,
this would amount to a reduction in delay by over 10%. Interestingly, the politicians do not appear
to be discriminating across signals based on party lines, in that signals coming from their own and
other party have about the same impact.
An unexpected result in the rst two columns is that Facebook adoption increases delay by over
58 days. It is quite possible that Facebook is a close substitute for Twitter, in that loyal Facebook
users may nd it hard to allocate time to Twitter use.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
According the third and fourth columns, having a Facebook account speeds up the adoption
of Twitter by at least 147 days. Our results are consistent with the idea that Facebook account
holders likely have a more precise prior about the value of Twitter, and therefore, have less incentive
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to delay for the possibility of more information. Furthermore, we nd that the acceleration e¤ect
associated with the past adopterssignals is dampened by about 20 days for Facebook users.
Interestingly, when signals are categorized by party, we nd that holding a Facebook account
dampens the acceleration e¤ect associated with the averaged signals from adopters belonging to
the same party, but not for the averaged signals from adopters belonging to a di¤erent party.
This result, found in the fourth column of Table 4, suggests that while politicians do not appear
to be discriminating signals based on parties, the way in which they use these signals may di¤er
depending on where these signals come from. One possible explanation is that the signals coming
from a rival party do not enter a politicians utility through a learning mechanism, but instead
through a competition model, in which a politician feels pressure to compete for attention against
his/her ideological rivals who have already garnered signicant visible support on Twitter.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Table 5 reveals that the interaction between an adopters order (i.e., the number of those
preceding him) and the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters has a positive
and signicant coe¢ cient. This nding provides some support for the fourth hypothesis generated
by our simple model. Unlike the interactions between Facebook adoption and positive information
signals, we nd that the dampening e¤ect associated with the number of past adopters has the
expected sign regardless of whether they are interacted with the signals coming from those of the
same or other political party.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
The e¤ect associated with the squared average followers/Tweet is estimated to be positive and
signicant in the rst column of Table 6. This means that the acceleration e¤ect has its greatest
marginal impact for small values of this average of past outcomes. Our nding here is consistent
with the hypothesis which states that the marginal e¤ect associated with past outcomes is concave.
The estimates for our control variables are in general quite noisy. Nevertheless, some have
interesting signs. Members who belong to a large number of committees tend to take longer to
adopt Twitter. This may highlight the fact that being in a number of committees results in a
larger workload/responsibility, and therefore, less time/resources to devote towards social media
management. It is also worth noting that not only are Democrats less likely to adopt Twitter
(Table 3), they are also slower at adopting Twitter.
Our estimates in the rst two columns of Table 7 reveal a strong relationship between a politi-
cians own realized number of followers/Tweet, and the average followers/Tweet of adopters prior
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to him/her. An increase in the past adoptersaggregated signal by 8 yields an increase in own
followers/Tweet by over 8. This e¤ect is slightly more pronounced when the signals come from
past adoptersbelonging to the same party, as shown in the second column. When the Facebook
adoption interactions are introduced, the acceleration e¤ect is slightly smaller; but this is perhaps
because the interacted term between Facebook adoption and past adopterssignal is also positive.
Indeed, those who receive favorable signals and are Facebook adopters than those who receive
favorable signals but are not Facebook adopters.
[INSERT TABLE 7]
The model presented earlier cannot explain this result. Nevertheless, the observed phenomenon
may still be consistent with the idea of Facebook as an indicator for preciseness of a politicians
prior on social media value. Politicians who are more comfortable with social media may be able
to better utilize the information available to them, while politicians who are not as comfortable
with social media, while reacting strongly to positive signals, may not turn their adoption decision
into realized success. Although past adoptersprovide some idea as to the demand for politicians
on Twitter, much of a politicians success on Twitter largely depends on his/her inherent ability to
keep followers captivated with insightful and informative Twitter updates.
[INSERT TABLE 9]
Our sensitivity analysis displayed in Table 9 reveals that the estimates for the acceleration e¤ect
are of the correct sign and statistically signicant regardless of whether our regression accounts for
unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, or self selection. Note however that the magnitude of
the e¤ect drops signicantly when we allow the error terms to have an AR(1) structure. In fact,
we nd that the magnitude of a the e¤ect falls to about 3 days (for an increase of 8 average
followers/Tweet for past adopters). Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson test leads to a rejection of
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Therefore, much of the e¤ect associated with the past
adoptersaggregate signal confounds temporal shocks. Nevertheless, we nd it encouraging that
the signals still play some, albeit small, role in the timing decision for Twitter adoption when
correlated errors are introduced.
[INSERT TABLE 10]
Table 10 shows that for the most part, our results regarding own success are robust to the
aforementioned identication problems. The estimated positive e¤ect of past adopterssuccess on
a current adopters own success falls under the AR(1) model; note however that we are unable
to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson test. Therefore, the
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results in the second column lack statistical credibility.
[INSERT TABLES 11 AND 12]
Our results are preserved when we only use sub-samples of our original sample. The rst column
of Table 11 shows that the acceleration e¤ect holds even when we only consider adopters who started
using Twitter outside the time interval surrounding the start of o¢ ce. Similarly, the second column
of Table 11 demonstrates that this e¤ect holds when we exclude the earliest adopters, who have
very little past adoption information to go on. Much the same can be said for the results in Table
12, which show that the favorable information from the past lead to better realized outcomes.
[INSERT TABLE 13]
The e¤ect of past adopterssuccess appears to be preserved when we add contextual e¤ects as
the last column of Table 13 shows. Nevertheless, some of the estimated contextual e¤ects are worth
mentioning. The strongest contextual e¤ects are the average number of incumbents and the average
number of committee chairs. Increasing the average proportion of incumbents by one standard
deviation speeds up the time of adoption by 476 days, and increasing the average proportion of
committee chairs by one standard deviation speeds up adoption by at least 75 days. The average
proportion of past adopters who are black, Catholic, law degree holders and Ivy league graduates
also accelerate the adoption process. All in all, these contextual e¤ects are consistent with our
intuition that some politicians may be adopting Twitter not only because of the information they
receive from their peers, but also to connect with their peers; especially those with political power
(i.e., incumbents and chairs), and those with access to rich social networks (i.e., former lawyers and
Ivy league alumni). Our analysis also suggests that politicians may benet from these contextual
e¤ects. Table 14 hows that their realized number of followers/Tweet is positively associated with
the average number of Catholics and Ivy league alumni among past adopters, as well as the average
number of adopters who are chairs of congressional committees.
[INSERT TABLE 14]
What makes these contextual e¤ects compelling is the observation that own characteristics are
unable to explain adoption timing nor own adoption success. Consequently, a nding like this also
limits our ability to say that social learning is the only story behind the patterns we observe: the
alternative explanation involving network externalities is certainly plausible, as peer characteristics
related to skill (i.e., political power) and peer characteristics related to networking (i.e., social
characteristics) matter. Not surprisingly, the e¤ect associated with past information falls as more
and more of these contextual e¤ects are included to each regression. This pattern may reect the
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idea that our initial estimates confound both learning and network e¤ects.
6.1 Extensions
In this subsection, we evaluate alternative interpretations of how politicians use the information
they have at their disposal. For much of our analysis, we have assumed that the information signals
are in the form of averaged past outcomes. This specication may be dubious for a few reasons.
First, politicians may only have knowledge of recent signals; second, politicians may react to these
signals only if past information has the potential to change their prior (i.e., positive/negative
surprises); and third, information quality may vary depending on the geographic distance of these
signals.
6.1.1 New information vs old information
Our analysis certainly suggests that the success of past adopters plays some role in the timing
decision of Twitter adoption. What we dont know though is whether politicians take into account
all of the signals. It is no plausible that the politicians or their sta¤ers will pay attention to the
success rates for each and every past adopter; especially for the late adopters who have over 100
possible signals to take in. In this section, we wish to test the hypothesis that only recent signals
matter. To test this hypothesis, we compare the following specications:
1. One in which we only consider the 10 most recent past adopters when calculating the average
followers/Tweet.
2. One in which we only consider the 20 most recent past adopters when calculating the average
followers/Tweet.
3. One in which we consider the latter 10 (of the 20 most recent) past adopters when calculating
the average followers/Tweet.
When we pass the data through these three di¤erent specications, some interesting patterns
emerge as displayed in Table 15. First, the e¤ect associated with past adoption success is stronger
for the rst specication than for the latter. This pattern means that when looking at the 20
most recent adopters, politicians more strongly to the 10 most recent outcomes than to the 10
latter outcomes. Under the sequential learning paradigm, this result would suggest that newer
information matters more. However, the e¤ect is strongest in the second specication, in which all
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of the 20 recent outcomes are included when calculating the average. Although newer information
trumps older information, politicians are not acting as though old information is completely useless.
[INSERT TABLES 15 AND 16]
As shown in Table 16, the e¤ect associated with the average followers/Tweet among recent
adopters is negative across the board. Note however that the last specication yields the least
negative e¤ect, and the second specication yields the largest negative e¤ect. Using recent infor-
mation would not yield much of a payo¤, especially if there are few observations to go by and if
the information is based on relatively outdated outcomes.
6.1.2 Positive and negative surprises
We now attempt to identify whether each politicians realized number of followers/Tweet was a
positive or negative surprise given his ex ante expectation. It is of course impossible to perfectly
estimate each politicians expectation; however, we can obtain predicted values, E(fi), of the
realized followers/Tweet using the estimates from Table 6. Using this proxy for expected success,
we identify a positive surprise as the case when the realized followers/Tweet exceeds a politicians
expectation, fi   E(fi) > 0, and a negative surprise if the opposite is true, fi   E(fi) < 0. With
these values, we can then approximate the average proportion of positive (and negative) surprises
among past adopters.
Intuitively, we should see that an increase in the proportion of positive surprises have a similar
impact as an increase in the expected value associated Twitter adoption. The opposite should hold
with respect to negative surprises. Framing our analysis in this manner gives us the ability to check
how sensitive our results are to the interpretation of ex ante expectations.
[INSERT TABLE 17]
Table 17 suggests that positive surprises behave in a similar manner as an increase in the average
number of followers/Tweet among past adopters. A standard deviation increase in the percentage
of positive surprises yields a decrease in adoption time by about 256 days. Negative surprises have
the opposite e¤ect: an increase in the percentage of negative surprises yields an increase in adoption
time by about 23 days. Here we see that politicians react more strongly to positive surprises, than
to negative surprises.
6.1.3 Does geography matter?
Earlier analysis has already shown that politicians do not discriminate between information from
past outcomes of peers who belong to the same political party, and past outcomes of peers who
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belong to a di¤erent party. But the same may not be true if politicians have an opportunity to
discriminate based on geography. The relationship between geographic distance and information
quality is well established (Malloy, 2005), so we would expect that politicians prefer to synthesize
information from sources nearest them. Although the past outcomes are observable to all, there may
be additional parcels of information that cannot be conferred through this statistic alone; such as
details regarding functionality, suggested Twitter topics, and general sentiment among constituents
who discuss politics on Twitter.
[INSERT TABLES 18 AND 19]
In this extension, we consider the possibility that politicians discriminate across signals based
on whether these signals come from past adopters who govern districts within the same state, or
whether these signals originate from outside their respective home states. Tables 18 and 19 display
the results from our estimations using these new denitions for past adoption success. In general,
politicians react similarly to both sources of information. The di¤erence is the magnitude to which
they speed up adoption. We nd that a standard deviation change by 5 followers/Tweet among
politicians belonging to a di¤erent state yields 3 times the e¤ect than that associated with the same
change to the followers/Tweet among politicians within the same state. One alternative explanation
for this observation is that Twitter is also used to maintain connections between politicians and
citizens outside of their main constituent base. By reaching out to constituents belonging to districts
of their peers, a politician may achieve greater success at coercing his rivals to support contentious
bills/policies by rst establishing a "grassroots" movement in districts beyond their jurisdiction.
Note however that when we analyze the impact of past adoption success on own realized suc-
cess, we are only able to nd a positive relationship between own success and favorable information
coming out of the same state. This nding suggests that politicians are using information from
di¤erent sources di¤erently. The fact that politicians accelerate adoption in light of good signals
near them, and that these good signals also benet them ex post provides some evidence of in-
formational advantage based on geography. We can only conjecture the exact motivation behind
rapid adoption in light of good signals coming outside of their state.
7 Conclusion
Our analysis exploits a unique feature about the adoption of Twitter in Congress: knowing the exact
date of adoption allows us not only to analyze the speed of adoption, but all the information available
at the time of adoption. Knowing who the past adopters are, as well as their success at attaining
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followers/Tweet, gives a current adopter valuable information about the value of Twitter as a
mode for inuence. Twitter is primarily a broadcasting device for politicians (Golbeck, Grimes and
Rogers, 2010), so being able to assess its outreach capabilities is especially important to politicians.
Guided by our simple model of adoption delay, we nd that favorable information leads to
quicker adoption, and especially so for those who have di¤use priors. Furthermore, we nd that
politicians who adopt Twitter after receiving favorable information signals benet via increased
clout for their own Twitter presence upon adoption. Although our results are suggestive of social
learning, we cannot completely rule out alternative explanations such as network externalities.
The unique feature of our data su¤ers from some of the problems associated with time series
analysis. Given that the adoption decisions are at times clustered near one another, persistent
temporal shocks limit our ability to make any strong statements regarding the impact of information
on adoption speed. In spite of this limitation, we are still able to produce an acceleration e¤ect
consistent with our models main prediction.
Although our extensions explore di¤erent avenues to which these signals a¤ect politicians, our
analysis assumes away learning within well-dened social networks. Although politicians do not
appear to react di¤erently to signals coming from di¤erent parties, it is plausible that they may react
strongly to signals coming from those they frequently contact. Some possible networks/groupings
that could be considered may be based on the congressional committees. A challenge of using these
denitions is that network/group formation likely takes place around the same time as Twitter
adoption. Instead, future work could incorporate the use of alumni networks, as in Cohen and
Malloy (2010), and investigate whether signals coming from alumni connections have a stronger
e¤ect at accelerating Twitter adoption than signals coming outside the alumni network.
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Table 1: Variable denitions
Variable Description
Days to adopt Days it takes politician to adopt relative to Barack Obamas rst Tweet
fi Ratio of followers per Tweet for i
f i Average ratio of followers per Tweet for adopters prior to i
f i;own Average ratio of followers per Tweet for adopters in same party as i
f i;other Average ratio of followers per Tweet for adopters in di¤erent party as i
Month-time Discretized time variable at a monthly level
log(Population) Log of the population for politician is governing district
log(Income) Log of the income for politician is governing district
Percentage black Percentage of Black constituents in politician is governing district
Gender Dummy set equal to 1 if female
Black Dummy set equal to 1 if black
Catholic Dummy set equal to 1 if Catholic
Law Dummy set equal to 1 if holds law degree
Ivy Dummy set equal to 1 if holds degree from an Ivy League school
Age Age of politician
Incumbent Dummy set equal to 1 if politician was in o¢ ce prior to the 2008 elections
Tenure How many years a politician has been in o¢ ce
Democrat Dummy set equal to 1 if belongs to Democratic party
Bills The total number of bills introduced by politician
Chair Dummy set equal to 1 if chairs a committee
Number of committees The total number of committees that politician belongs to
MySpace Dummy set equal to 1 if holds a MySpace account
RSS Dummy set equal to 1 if holds an RSS account
Flickr Dummy set equal to 1 if holds a Flickr account
Facebook Dummy set equal to 1 if holds a Facebook account
Youtube Dummy set equal to 1 if holds a Youtube account
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Table 2: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Days to adopt 695.148 200.487 -2 1116
fi 12.946 17.145 1.0813 109.667
f i 11.629 6.932 5.409 104.837
f i;own 11.417 7.306 4.111 104.837
f i;other 12.2 5.913 0 55.731
Month-time 17.352 6.089 2 36
log(Population) 13.364 0.214 10.96 15.2
log(Income) 10.643 0.262 9.620 11.43
Percentage black 12.637 15.963 0 96.400
Gender 0.167 0.373 0 1
Black 0.082 0.275 0 1
Catholic 0.292 0.455 0 1
Law 0.352 0.478 0 1
Ivy 0.098 0.298 0 1
Age 57.333 10.16 28 86
Incumbent 0.861 0.347 0 1
Tenure 9.550 8.711 0 54
Democrat 0.598 0.491 0 1
Bills 18.018 12.45 0 96
Chair 0.103 0.304 0 1
Number of committees 1.936 0.826 0 4
MySpace 0.014 0.116 0 1
RSS 0.573 0.495 0 1
Flickr 0.151 0.358 0 1
Facebook 0.571 0.496 0 1
Youtube 0.731 0.444 0 1
N 183
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Table 3: Characterization of who adopts Twitter using a Probit model of adoption. Dependent
variable is equal to 1 if politician adopts Twitter.
(1)
Adopt Twitter
log(Population) 0.872 (0.378)
log(Income) 0.0921 (0.287)
Percentage black 0.00616 (0.00548)
Gender 0.214 (0.180)
Black -0.427 (0.326)
Catholic 0.0892 (0.159)
Law 0.0402 (0.144)
Ivy 0.377 (0.227)
Age -0.0120 (0.00791)
Incumbent -0.336 (0.216)
Tenure -0.00844 (0.0113)
Democrat -0.932 (0.160)
Bills 0.0184 (0.00559)
Chair -0.0244 (0.234)
Number of committees -0.0391 (0.0865)
MySpace 0.820 (0.728)
RSS 0.220 (0.142)
Flickr 0.405 (0.188)
Facebook 0.702 (0.153)
Youtube 0.120 (0.177)
Constant -12.39 (5.831)
Observations 438
R2 0.2051
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 4: The relationship between the speed of adoption and the follower success of past adopters.
Days to adopt is dened as the total number of days it takes politician i to adopt relative to Barack
Obamas rst Tweet on April 29, 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
Month-time 5.718 (1.077) 3.883 (0.809) 5.429 (0.950) 3.706 (0.736)
log(Population) -47.20 (36.46) -43.88 (29.87) -67.77 (34.52) -62.86 (24.83)
log(Income) -53.02 (43.06) -52.36 (36.37) -66.99 (40.43) -64.86 (34.25)
Percentage black -0.281 (0.680) -0.413 (0.528) -0.237 (0.647) -0.707 (0.482)
Gender 30.95 (26.37) 14.44 (20.69) 32.06 (25.11) 13.95 (19.46)
Black -30.66 (38.98) -34.71 (31.68) -32.41 (37.28) -17.94 (32.76)
Catholic -5.102 (26.24) -8.413 (19.37) 14.17 (24.53) -4.256 (17.75)
Law 2.821 (21.16) 2.911 (17.21) 7.974 (19.53) 5.017 (15.75)
Ivy 32.36 (42.03) 13.25 (32.12) 1.530 (31.99) -8.901 (28.20)
Age 0.904 (1.139) 0.745 (0.856) 0.884 (1.049) 0.889 (0.783)
Incumbent -23.40 (24.88) -0.206 (19.75) -43.53 (23.23) -7.209 (19.25)
Tenure 2.803 (1.875) 1.091 (1.408) 4.227 (1.671) 1.076 (1.395)
Democrat 43.51 (26.41) 17.40 (25.61) 40.02 (24.52) 8.253 (23.15)
Bills -1.070 (0.894) -0.451 (0.675) -0.903 (0.853) -0.327 (0.575)
Chair -7.556 (44.00) 16.61 (30.19) -5.171 (42.45) 7.640 (27.43)
Number of committees 11.98 (10.82) 12.34 (8.340) 9.446 (9.802) 5.600 (7.657)
MySpace -59.52 (31.36) -32.56 (21.67) -66.15 (35.21) -33.40 (20.63)
RSS -7.650 (22.31) 1.941 (16.84) 1.406 (21.34) 10.54 (15.73)
Flickr -32.57 (26.00) -33.23 (20.29) -42.69 (24.82) -39.86 (20.52)
Facebook 77.35 (28.42) 58.30 (20.86) -285.8 (73.29) -147.6 (79.01)
Youtube -31.67 (42.55) -24.28 (31.65) -29.29 (39.14) -32.03 (26.67)
f i -14.42 (4.964) -32.32 (2.527)
f i;own -16.45 (3.623) -28.23 (1.993)
f i;other -19.16 (1.637) -19.01 (1.647)
Facebook * f i 20.96 (4.378)
Facebook * f i;own 13.67 (3.394)
Facebook * f i;other -1.843 (2.841)
Constant 1956.7 (784.9) 2298.4 (664.6) 2697.7 (766.3) 2911.0 (604.0)
Observations 183 183 183 183
R2 0.5874 0.7639 0.6649 0.8067
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 5: The relationship between the speed of adoption and the follower success of past adopters.
Days to adopt is dened as the total number of days it takes politician i to adopt relative to Barack
Obamas rst Tweet on April 29, 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
(i  1) 3.117 (0.153) 2.957 (0.272) 0.369 (1.241) 1.371 (0.984)
Month-time -1.905 (0.574) -1.628 (0.680) -1.571 (0.595) -1.502 (0.732)
log(Population) -21.92 (17.14) -17.66 (19.75) -19.80 (16.89) -24.71 (21.12)
log(Income) -15.86 (20.28) -23.14 (22.89) -16.87 (19.66) -26.09 (22.73)
Percentage black -0.434 (0.330) -0.549 (0.365) -0.459 (0.331) -0.547 (0.381)
Gender -1.308 (10.68) -0.460 (11.03) -0.757 (10.44) -3.093 (11.25)
Black -11.32 (20.63) -5.227 (22.74) -14.55 (19.53) -12.08 (22.73)
Catholic -24.27 (10.80) -25.40 (11.33) -22.59 (10.53) -22.68 (11.29)
Law -3.578 (9.282) -6.744 (9.655) -7.072 (9.285) -8.657 (9.821)
Ivy 6.284 (13.68) 4.192 (14.39) 3.989 (13.36) 0.950 (14.53)
Age -0.356 (0.526) 0.0305 (0.588) -0.470 (0.520) -0.289 (0.572)
Incumbent 6.572 (11.78) 8.273 (12.95) 4.369 (11.75) 3.387 (13.07)
Tenure -0.881 (0.827) -1.242 (0.947) -0.549 (0.803) -0.897 (0.904)
Democrat 2.681 (9.888) 16.83 (16.88) 3.892 (9.879) -17.58 (28.44)
Bills 0.311 (0.278) 0.285 (0.283) 0.382 (0.274) 0.431 (0.300)
Chair 9.975 (15.11) 8.018 (14.89) 6.164 (14.80) 5.947 (14.53)
Number of committees 0.642 (5.402) 1.059 (5.590) -0.789 (5.277) -0.267 (5.518)
MySpace 34.72 (28.17) 35.16 (29.73) 34.26 (25.07) 40.28 (26.16)
RSS 3.494 (10.23) 4.377 (10.54) 4.396 (10.28) 6.080 (10.78)
Flickr -3.440 (11.06) -7.234 (12.35) 0.682 (11.17) -5.066 (12.23)
Facebook 24.32 (10.66) 24.85 (11.71) 21.56 (10.09) 25.97 (11.11)
Youtube -17.08 (14.72) -24.06 (15.18) -20.95 (14.72) -28.29 (16.19)
f i -6.707 (1.621) -6.119 (1.534)
f i;own -6.615 (1.543) -6.135 (1.449)
f i;other -3.065 (3.141) -1.963 (2.952)
(i  1) * f i 0.230 (0.105)
(i  1) * f i;own 0.115 (0.0548)
(i  1) * f i;other 0.0242 (0.0380)
Constant 1027.0 (379.6) 1091.4 (446.9) 960.5 (373.7) 1182.3 (454.5)
Observations 183 183 183 183
R2 0.9302 0.9190 0.9324 0.9223
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 6: The relationship between the speed of adoption and the follower success of past adopters.
Days to adopt is dened as the total number of days it takes politician i to adopt relative to Barack
Obamas rst Tweet on April 29, 2007.
(1) (2)
Days to adopt Days to adopt
Month-time 3.514 (0.749) 2.909 (0.692)
log(Population) -63.23 (24.38) -32.71 (24.06)
log(Income) -28.34 (34.08) -40.87 (28.40)
Percentage black -0.678 (0.492) -0.784 (0.481)
Gender 12.82 (17.94) 11.51 (16.84)
Black -11.34 (27.78) -7.768 (31.04)
Catholic 3.820 (17.54) -9.755 (16.65)
Law -0.465 (14.66) -7.316 (13.82)
Ivy -33.47 (26.10) -18.02 (25.82)
Age 0.462 (0.706) 1.361 (0.794)
Incumbent -17.25 (18.21) 3.774 (17.88)
Tenure 1.678 (1.325) -0.0986 (1.317)
Democrat 36.22 (18.32) 70.25 (26.34)
Bills -0.225 (0.562) -0.105 (0.463)
Chair 3.221 (27.58) 8.079 (22.08)
numcommittees 4.518 (7.541) 7.058 (7.469)
MySpace -45.49 (21.35) -24.92 (23.44)
RSS 4.860 (16.93) 5.021 (13.46)
Flickr -11.09 (18.47) -26.95 (16.92)
Facebook 26.93 (16.78) 31.56 (15.28)
Youtube -38.78 (28.59) -45.96 (23.80)
f i -51.72 (5.325)
f2 i 0.381
 (0.0429)
f i;own -36.88 (2.657)
f i;other -18.41 (5.376)
f2 i;own 0.219
 (0.0239)
f2 i;other 0.00115 (0.0819)
Constant 2498.3 (639.6) 2289.4 (557.5)
Observations 183 183
R2 0.8201 0.8502
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 7: The relationship between own follower success and the follower success of past adopters.
Followers/Tweet (fi) is an approximation based on the total number of followers divided by the
total number of Twitter posts at the time of data collection.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
Days to adopt 0.0130 (0.0109) 0.0324 (0.0103) 0.00439 (0.0130) 0.0295 (0.0117)
Month-time 0.0681 (0.146) 0.0490 (0.140) 0.104 (0.151) 0.0745 (0.147)
log(Population) -6.064 (4.360) -6.344 (3.963) -7.411 (4.579) -6.866 (4.292)
log(Income) -7.466 (4.486) -6.484 (4.137) -8.560 (4.683) -7.415 (4.347)
Percentage black -0.197 (0.106) -0.177 (0.101) -0.198 (0.106) -0.156 (0.0966)
Gender 0.954 (2.810) 0.857 (2.793) 1.271 (2.738) 1.148 (2.754)
Black 8.369 (10.91) 8.512 (10.65) 8.025 (10.92) 7.705 (10.57)
Catholic 0.857 (2.664) 1.465 (2.632) 1.695 (2.751) 2.103 (2.690)
Law -1.138 (2.566) -0.786 (2.567) -0.878 (2.551) -0.809 (2.641)
Ivy 5.924 (5.726) 5.552 (5.643) 4.791 (5.980) 4.622 (6.097)
Age 0.138 (0.156) 0.0919 (0.155) 0.145 (0.157) 0.0988 (0.156)
Incumbent 0.292 (3.103) -0.548 (3.076) -0.830 (3.216) -1.551 (3.238)
Tenure -0.172 (0.173) -0.112 (0.163) -0.0830 (0.179) -0.0145 (0.173)
Democrat 0.606 (2.903) -1.270 (3.194) 0.820 (2.849) -0.341 (3.307)
Bills 0.156 (0.152) 0.150 (0.149) 0.155 (0.146) 0.142 (0.141)
Chair -3.116 (3.880) -3.057 (3.844) -3.071 (3.578) -3.076 (3.718)
Number of committees 0.188 (1.115) 0.133 (1.082) 0.175 (1.078) 0.344 (1.056)
MySpace 22.91 (7.740) 22.73 (7.229) 22.10 (7.482) 21.77 (7.144)
RSS 0.291 (2.909) 0.363 (2.899) 0.640 (2.869) 0.306 (2.841)
Flickr -4.951 (2.124) -4.014 (2.025) -5.694 (2.224) -4.504 (2.046)
Facebook -4.192 (4.403) -4.836 (4.263) -20.14 (9.283) -28.99 (16.38)
Youtube -0.846 (4.953) 0.487 (4.587) -1.009 (4.818) 0.855 (4.359)
f i 1.059 (0.188) 0.116 (0.487)
f i;own 1.454 (0.237) 0.974 (0.535)
f i;other 0.941 (0.385) 0.405 (0.338)
Facebook * f i 0.959 (0.511)
Facebook * f i;own 0.568 (0.530)
Facebook * f i;other 0.839 (0.514)
Constant 141.9 (92.96) 101.7 (79.06) 192.6 (104.0) 136.6 (93.28)
Observations 183 183 183 183
R2 0.2827 0.3216 0.3007 0.3405
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 8: The relationship between own follower success and the follower success of past adopters.
Followers/Tweet (fi) is an approximation based on the total number of followers divided by the
total number of Twitter posts at the time of data collection.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
Days to adopt 0.0524 (0.0178) 0.0425 (0.0174) 0.0401 (0.0175) 0.0393 (0.0181)
(i  1) -0.148 (0.0743) -0.0452 (0.0593) -1.209 (0.375) -0.370 (0.183)
Month-time 0.204 (0.173) 0.0942 (0.154) 0.314 (0.182) 0.169 (0.161)
log(Population) -5.404 (4.149) -6.304 (3.972) -4.827 (4.095) -5.608 (3.932)
log(Income) -7.138 (4.289) -6.405 (4.112) -7.734 (4.297) -6.192 (3.954)
Percentage black -0.179 (0.103) -0.171 (0.100) -0.194 (0.107) -0.188 (0.103)
Gender 1.265 (2.813) 0.940 (2.814) 1.469 (2.893) 1.617 (2.987)
Black 8.659 (10.78) 8.410 (10.61) 7.227 (9.754) 8.485 (10.15)
Catholic 1.967 (2.953) 1.809 (2.860) 2.341 (2.954) 1.851 (2.836)
Law -0.945 (2.557) -0.668 (2.551) -2.388 (2.576) -1.328 (2.604)
Ivy 5.885 (5.705) 5.558 (5.655) 5.044 (5.089) 4.972 (5.366)
Age 0.162 (0.161) 0.0954 (0.157) 0.112 (0.150) 0.0768 (0.167)
Incumbent -0.207 (3.108) -0.675 (3.084) -1.008 (3.086) -0.754 (3.206)
Tenure -0.108 (0.172) -0.0869 (0.168) 0.0143 (0.154) -0.0344 (0.157)
Democrat 0.828 (2.924) -1.436 (3.122) 1.346 (2.882) 3.768 (8.017)
Bills 0.133 (0.155) 0.143 (0.152) 0.165 (0.148) 0.155 (0.154)
Chair -3.649 (3.667) -3.093 (3.779) -5.052 (3.436) -3.646 (3.688)
Number of committees 0.253 (1.100) 0.182 (1.090) -0.312 (1.135) -0.269 (1.143)
MySpace 20.79 (7.345) 22.02 (7.275) 21.03 (6.662) 21.59 (7.188)
RSS 0.0640 (2.901) 0.306 (2.901) 0.468 (2.762) 0.639 (2.910)
Flickr -5.049 (2.145) -4.078 (2.071) -3.442 (1.990) -3.140 (1.963)
Facebook -4.725 (4.336) -4.910 (4.259) -5.533 (4.172) -5.971 (4.184)
Youtube -0.290 (4.648) 0.728 (4.465) -2.048 (4.450) 0.0344 (4.157)
f i 1.261 (0.180) 1.414 (0.166)
f i;own 1.469 (0.247) 1.589 (0.259)
f i;other 0.888 (0.352) 0.809 (0.295)
(i  1) * f i 0.0920 (0.0310)
(i  1) * f i;own 0.00708 (0.0121)
(i  1) * f i;other 0.0199 (0.00967)
Constant 108.9 (85.43) 97.08 (79.15) 94.85 (84.39) 79.10 (77.41)
Observations 183 183 183 183
R2 0.3005 0.3233 0.3459 0.3426
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 9: Robustness of results. The rst column controls for the order of entry, the second column
controls for serial correlation, and the third column controls for sample selection using the 2-step
Heckman method.
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
f i -6.707 (1.621) -0.458 (0.201) -14.39 (1.325)
(i  1) 3.117 (0.153)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
 0.980
 -141.7 (187.0)
Observations 183 182 438
R2 0.9302 0.1251
Durbin-Watson statistic 0.432990
Wald statistic 325.26
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 10: Robustness of results. The rst column controls for the order of entry, the second column
controls for serial correlation, and the third column controls for sample selection using the 2-step
Heckman method.
(1) (2) (3)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
f i 1.261 (0.180) 0.481 (0.363) 1.065 (0.470)
(i  1) -0.148 (0.0743)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
 -0.0756
 50.94 (51.63)
Observations 183 182 438
R2 0.3005 0.1575
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.062
Wald statistic 107.30
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 11: Robustness of results with respect to temporal events. The rst column considers the
subsample of adopters who did not adopt Twitter before and after the start of session (January 20,
2009) by 100 days. The second column considers the subsample of adopters i > 50.
(1) (2)
Days to adopt Days to adopt
f i -14.98 (4.766) -108.9 (11.97)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 95 133
R2 0.6472 0.7166
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 12: Robustness of results with respect to temporal events. The rst column considers the
subsample of adopters who did not adopt Twitter before and after the start of session (January 20,
2009) by 100 days. The second column considers the subsample of adopters i > 50.
(1) (2)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
f i 1.004 (0.251) 8.017 (3.120)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 95 133
R2 0.3508 0.2817
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 13: Robustness of results with respect to contextual e¤ects. Note here that the average
values are with respect to the past adopters.
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
f i -14.68 (4.155) -7.909 (3.471) -6.917 (3.259)
Average log(Population) 1745.5 (151.1) 248.2 (193.3) 338.2 (278.5)
Average log(Income) -2269.2 (185.8) -504.0 (225.7) -401.4 (336.1)
Average percentage black 36.93 (7.865) -12.11 (9.949) -6.469 (8.932)
Average number of females 1207.5 (328.9) 1391.9 (290.9)
Average number of blacks -615.7 (949.6) -1404.7 (752.3)
Average number of catholics -353.0 (264.3) -384.6 (290.0)
Average number of law degree holders -240.4 (161.9) -143.8 (152.0)
Average number of Ivy league alumni 365.7 (201.7) -346.3 (216.0)
Average age 31.88 (8.325) 12.87 (9.115)
Average number of incumbents -702.1 (244.2) -1904.3 (292.3)
Average tenure 69.58 (20.17) 115.3 (19.10)
Average number of Democrats 1431.6 (217.9) 1113.5 (183.7)
Average number of bills 9.348 (7.821) 16.49 (7.646)
Average number of chairs -3135.5 (323.3) -2502.5 (306.9)
Average number of committees 108.7 (133.8) -205.3 (126.9)
Average number of MySpace users -1506.5 (570.2)
Average number of RSS users -25.36 (109.1)
Average number of Flickr users -72.41 (232.3)
Average number of Facebook users 1554.5 (252.7)
Average number of Youtube users -1258.9 (214.6)
Constant 3218.9 (696.7) 1252.0 (451.4) 979.9 (391.7)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183 183 183
R2 0.8615 0.9701 0.9800
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 14: Robustness of results with respect to contextual e¤ects. Note here that the average
values are with respect to the past adopters.
(1) (2) (3)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
f i 3.663 (1.834) 3.856 (1.851) 3.571 (1.672)
Average log(Population) 41.70 (29.66) 37.69 (49.25) 122.2 (96.26)
Average log(Income) -30.76 (40.30) 2.613 (58.19) -129.5 (107.0)
Average percentage black -0.393 (1.588) 0.959 (3.591) -1.221 (4.020)
Average number of females -46.15 (142.7) -76.38 (143.5)
Average number of blacks 120.0 (341.2) 65.46 (336.2)
Average number of catholics 120.8 (73.86) 202.1 (95.93)
Average number of law degree holders -95.32 (56.32) -39.43 (61.83)
Average number of Ivy league alumni 71.71 (92.44) 142.1 (125.0)
Average age -3.362 (3.767) -1.538 (3.455)
Average number of incumbents -160.2 (103.5) -131.3 (135.2)
Average tenure -1.559 (8.408) -1.049 (8.939)
Average number of Democrats -123.2 (81.10) -257.5 (119.7)
Average number of bills 1.176 (1.694) 1.347 (1.847)
Average number of chairs 177.5 (245.3) 119.0 (227.2)
Average number of committees -4.814 (70.41) 20.58 (72.73)
Average number of MySpace users 453.6 (285.2)
Average number of RSS users 4.991 (47.62)
Average number of Flickr users 158.2 (99.41)
Average number of Facebook users -58.14 (104.8)
Average number of Youtube users 90.29 (104.1)
Constant -115.0 (171.9) -146.1 (203.1) -115.7 (188.9)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183 183 183
R2 0.3276 0.3809 0.4061
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 15: Which information signals matter? The rst specication (Column 1) denes f i to be
the average followers/Tweet among the 10 most recent adopters prior to i, the second specication
(Column 2) denes f i to be the average followers/Tweet among the 20 most recent adopters prior
to i, and the third specication (Column 3) denes f i to be thea average followers/Tweet among
the latter 10 (of the 20 most recent adopters).
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
f i -14.75 (2.982) -17.51 (4.136) -6.619 (3.456)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173 163 163
R2 0.3878 0.4007 0.3346
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 16: Which information signals matter? The rst specication (Column 1) denes f i to be
the average followers/Tweet among the 10 most recent adopters prior to i, the second specication
(Column 2) denes f i to be the average followers/Tweet among the 20 most recent adopters prior
to i, and the third specication (Column 3) denes f i to be thea average followers/Tweet among
the latter 10 (of the 20 most recent adopters).
(1) (2) (3)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
f i -0.519 (0.250) -0.617 (0.379) -0.139 (0.186)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173 163 163
R2 0.1819 0.2436 0.2344
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 17: How adoption is a¤ected by positive and/or negative surprises. A positive surprise for
each individual i is dened as 1[(fi E(fi)) > 0] and a negative surprise is dened as 1[(fi E(fi)) <
0]. The average contains all  i who adopted prior to i.
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
Average number of positive surprises -1054.0 (59.31) -1056.4 (55.88)
Average number of negative surprises 28.07 (514.0) 116.7 (65.40)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182 182 182
R2 0.7863 0.2865 0.7878
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 18: Does geography matter? Here, f i;samestate is dened as the average number of follow-
ers/Tweet among past adopters whose districts are in the same state as i, and f i;diffstate is dened
as the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters whose districts are not in the same
state as i.
(1) (2) (3)
Days to adopt Days to adopt Days to adopt
f i;samestate -6.525 (1.535) -10.78 (1.026)
f i;diffstate -26.61 (7.118) -31.15 (7.041)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183 183 183
R2 0.3569 0.6021 0.7455
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 19: Does geography matter? Here, f i;samestate is dened as the average number of follow-
ers/Tweet among past adopters whose districts are in the same state as i, and f i;diffstate is dened
as the average number of followers/Tweet among past adopters whose districts are not in the same
state as i.
(1) (2) (3)
Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet Followers/Tweet
f i;samestate 1.009 (0.132) 0.950 (0.151)
f i;diffstate -1.468 (0.774) -0.223 (0.299)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183 183 183
R2 0.3258 0.2294 0.3269
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Figure 1: Twitter adoption over time.
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Figure 2: Correlation between followers/Tweet and month of adoption
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